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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Section 78-2a3(2)(e) of the Utah Code Annotated, the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over "appeals from a court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or
capital felony."
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues requires consideration by the Court as a result of the May 18,
2005 Order and Decision by the Honorable John C. Backlund, trial court judge. The
ultimate legal question is whether Appellee, City of Orem (the "City"), acted illegally
when it charged Appellant with violating a statute that was not in effect a the time of the
alleged incident. Included within this review are the following issues:
1. Did the legislature intend to make a change of effect in 41-6-53 when it reworded
and renumbered 41-6-53 to 41-6a-701 in Senate Bill 5?
2. Did the City uniformly enforce the law, in compliance with Article I, Section 24 of
the Utah State Constitution, when it allowed other similarly situated defendants
the protections of the newly enacted 6a revisions, but not the Appellant?
3. Did the City violate the Appellant's Fourteenth Amendment rights when it failed
to follow its own policies and procedures in charging Appellant under a statute not
in force at the time of the alleged incident?
4. Was the pro se defendant particularly prejudiced by prosecution under the wrong
statute?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."
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3

U n i t e d S*'»»

, F :: i irteenth Amendment, Section 1 [Rights Guaranteed

Privileges and Immunities of Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection]
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States and s u b j c , . i;.~ y~. *•-•
IIHMVUI,

i

I /iiis i I ll (Initcil Sliid > ntiil of the Stnlr wherein they reside. N o

State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities o f citizens of the United States; nor shall aii> State deprive any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
™A ^ " E N T O F T H E C A S E

was not in effect either on the date of the alleged incident or on the date of the trial. The
United States Constitution, the Utah State Constitution, and the weight of centuries of
c o m m o n law include proviso u* a*, J ^..guage prohjunmg -i

.

s.

11 in' 11 T( ni i 1II i • judgment against the Appellant should be vacated.

STATEMEP f i ::: F RELEVANT FACTS
Oil McUwii z$ . --JV

vppeiiant was cited for " fail [sic] to stop at Police i oad
\npellant and the Prosecutor,

KIr. Church, discussed the appropriate charge. The Appellant brought the 6a revisions to
the attention of Mr. Chi irch, indicating also that the date of the offense was after the
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revisions took effect (the 6a revisions took effect on February 2n , 2005).
At the beginning of the trial on May 18th, 2005, Mr. Church moved to amend the
charge to 41-6-53, and the judge granted this motion. See Transcript at f3, Line 13
through TJ4, Line 5. After granting this motion, the Appellant correctly objected, stating
that the actual statute number was 41-6a-701. See Transcript at ^4, Line 6 and 7. In the
ensuing discussion, the judge asks the prosecutor if the statute takes effect after March
28th, and the prosecutor agrees, despite Mr. Church and the Appellant's previous
conversations on the subject and the fact that Mr. Church had at this point already
prosecuted numerous offenses under the 6a revisions that occurred before the incident in
question here. In addition, the original citation, which Mr. Church was amending, was
for a violation of the 6a revisions, specifically 41-6a-904 (1) (a).
The language from the 6a revision to 41-6-53 (under the new code section of 416a-701) is substantially different. Included in the changes to the revised 6a are an
exception that would specifically provide a defense in this case. This exception was not
available in 41-6-53, but under the law in effect at the time of the incident, the
Defendant's conduct is justified. The difficulties resulting from the different statutes can
be seen in the discussion between Appellant, Mr. Church, and Hon. Judge Backlund as
the judge is making his ruling. See Transcript at ^[52, Line 18 through ^56, Line 14.
Appellant at trial provided significant evidence that if an exception such as is
allowed in 41-6a-701 (1) (b) was recognized, he would have come under that protection.
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Included as evidence in this are the statements from the police officer (on direct
examination by Mr. Church) that it looked like the police cars were positioned to direct
traffic into the southbound lanes (see Transcript at f21, Line 10 through 13), video tape
evidence (see Transcript at ^47, Line 23, through ^[51, Line 24), and further evidence
from the police officer that the police repositioned the cones and cars to make it more
clear what the police officers wanted drivers to do. See Transcript at ^[30 Line 5 through
19. The difficulty caused by the misunderstanding of the correct statute and appropriate
exceptions available is seen in the actions of Hon. Judge Backlund to move past any
discussion of the conditions in the southbound lanes. See Transcript at Tf27 Line 14
through 16; and ^f28 Line 3 and 4, Line 6 through 7, Line 13 through 14, and Line 20 and
21. Without an exception in the statute, the judge is correct in his repeated assertions that
the fact that those lanes are "southbound lanes" is conclusive. With such an exception,
however, the condition of those southbound lanes becomes a key issue of fact.
BASIC RULE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Under the most basic understanding of statutory interpretation, any change by the
legislature of a statute is assumed to having meaning by the Court. If the legislature had
wanted to ensure that 41-6-53 remained the same in effect, they could have simply
renumbered it. The law must assume that the legislature is capable of not rewriting a
statute, and therefore the presumption is that the legislature did intend to make a change
in 41-6-53, and has in effect made a change in the resulting statute of 41-6a-701.
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JUDGMENT SHOULD BE OVERTURNED ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
Although the rights of defendants in civil traffic violations do not rise to the level
of the rights of criminal defendants, civil traffic defendants do have protected rights of
action and process. These include rights by the Utah State Constitution and the Federal
Constitution. Because Appellant raised the issue of the proper statute at trial (even
without the formal language of objection or exception), the standard is the lower standard
of reversible error as opposed to manifest and prejudicial error.
A.

Article I, Section 24 of the Utah State Constitution Guarantees Uniform
Application of Laws, and the Violation of These Rights in This Trial
Represents Reversible Error
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah State Constitution states that "[a]U laws of general

nature shall have uniform operation." The Utah Supreme Court has shown that a
violation of this standard is reversible error. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (1995). In
Mohi, the Supreme Court held that "Utah's uniform operation of laws provision
establishes different requirements than does the federal Equal Protection Clause. The
most important of these requirements, for the present analysis, is the requirement that "for
a law to be constitutional under [the provision], it is not enough that it be uniform on its
face. What is critical is that the operation of the law be uniform. A law does not operate
uniformly if'persons similarly situated1 are not 'treated similarly1. . . . " Id.) (quoting
Malan, 693 P.2d at 669)." Mohi at 37.
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The uniform operations test established by the Utah Supreme Court has two parts.
"First, a law must apply equally to all persons within a class. Second, the statutory
classifications and the different treatment given the classes must be based on differences
that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute." Malan v. Lewis,
693 P.2d 661, 671 (Utah 1984). If the actions of the state fail in either respect, it amounts
to reversible error.
The Utah Supreme Court established a pattern for examining such cases. "[W]e
must first determine what classifications, if any, are created by the statute. Second, we
must determine whether different classes or subclasses are treated disparately. Finally, if
any disparate treatment exists between classes or subclasses, we must determine whether
the legislature had any reasonable objective that warrants the disparity." Mohi at 44.
In this case, the analysis is straightforward. The classification created by the
statute are those cited for violation of this statute. A reasonable subclass for this
classification is the Appellant. Presumably every other individual pulled over in the
month of March for a similar infraction was charged under 41-6a-701, but Appellant was
charged under 41-6-53. Considering that the legislature made the statutory change, it is
difficult to imagine how this disparate treatment would have a reasonable objective that
warrants the disparity.
Because the actions of the State in this case fail the test established by the Utah
Supreme Court in interpreting Article I, Section 24, the actions of the State amount to
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reversible error and the judgment of the trial court should be overturned.
B.

Even Under the Less-Stringent Requirements for Civil Traffic Offenses, the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution Demands Courts
Adhere to Their Own Procedures
Individuals accused of civil traffic offenses are not entitled to the full scope of

Constitutional Protections provided to criminal defendants, but they are entitled to the
fully scope of Constitutional Protections provided to parties in a civil dispute with the
government. Included in this is the requirement that written procedure be followed.
In this case, the Defendant was charged with violating a statute that was not in
force at the time of the incident. The loss of property in this case, while not great, it still
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because the City of Orem did not follow its
own procedure.
Appellee acknowledges this error in Response to Sua Sponte Motion for Summary
Judgment, but claims that this does not amount to reversible error "[b]ecause neither the
facts of this case or the prosecution's theory ever changed [sic]." Response to Sua
Sponte Motion for Summary Judgment at 3. This is completely irrelevant. A basic
understanding of ex post facto laws illustrates that a defendant is not charged under a fact
pattern or under a theoiy of the case, they are charged under a statute. Fact patterns and
theories of cases are only tools used to assist the prosecutor in satisfying the statutory
demands placed upon them. Furthermore, Appellee would have no need to amend their
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theory of the case as the case was ultimately tried under the wrong statute. This action
represents reversible error, and the judgment of the trial court should be overturned.
ERRORS IN THIS CASE AMOUNT TO REVERSIBLE ERRORS
The errors existing in this case and acknowledged by Appellee in their Response
are significant, and represent rights strongly protected under the State and Federal
Constitution. In this case, the Defendant presented evidence, including photo and
videotape evidence, that the Court could have concluded provided protection for the
Defendant under the terms of the applicable statute. Instead of evaluating the evidence in
these terms, however, the Court maintained a dismissive attitude towards this evidence
more appropriate to the previous statute not in force at the time of the incident. It is
impossible to say for certain how the Court would have reacted to this evidence, but it is
certainly reasonable that upon seeing photo and videotape evidence demonstrating that
the police cars were positioned in such a way to direct traffic into the opposing lane the
Court may have come to a different conclusion. This is especially true when the
testifying officer admitted that it could have looked like the police were directing the
Defendant to take the very course of action he took.
Because there is sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable Court to conclude that
the Defendant was justified in his actions under 41-6a-701 (1) (b), the error does not
amount to harmless error in this case, and the judgment of the Court should be vacated.
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EVEN IF THIS COURT RULES THAT THE ERRORS IN THIS CASE DO NOT
AMOUNT TO REVERSIBLE ERRORS, THE DEFENDANT IN THIS
CASE WAS PARTICULARLY PREJUDICED BY PROSECUTION UNDER
THE WRONG STATUTE
Even should this Court find that the changes made represent harmless error in
general, in the case of a pro se defendant such a change represents reversible error.
Courts are not to argue law on behalf of the pro se defendant. See e.g. State v. Thomas,
961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998). However, the courts are historically and justifiably
concerned when a pro se defendant is disadvantaged by the legal process rather than the
law.
In this case, the Defendant came prepared to defend himself against a specific
statute with which he had familiarized himself. Changing that statute on the day of trial
represented a burden in general, but also represented a paiticularly large burden on a pro
se defendant, who lacks the experience with the legal process to be aware of his legal
options. The Court made no allowance for the Defendant to prepare for his defense
against a statute completely different from the one he was prepared to defend himself
against. Such a "change on the fly" is a difficult thing for most attorneys to accomplish,
and for a pro se defendant it is nearly impossible.
Any attempts or preparations made by the Defendant to couch his arguments or
examinations in terms of the existing statute were made useless by the use of the
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improper statute. Because of this, the error in this particular case was not harmless even if
such an error in general would have been harmless.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, for the above mentioned reasons, the APPELLANT asks this
Court for relief, including the vacating of the judgment of the lower Court.
DATED this 10 day of February, 2006.

James H. Brown
Pro Se Appellant and Defendant
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James Brown
255 W 2000 S.
Orem, UT 84058
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Appellate Court Case Number. 20050463-CA
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James Brown
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CITY OF OREM,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 20050463-CA
Trial Court Case Number: 055204006

vs.
ADDENDUM TO APPELLANT BRIEF
JAMES H BROWN,
Defendant and Appellant.

No addendum is necessary. All pertinent information that would appear in the addendum is
contained either in the court record or quoted verbatim in the appellant brief.
Dated this 23rd day of February, 2006.
Respectfully submitted,

u_
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u^

James H. Brown

/

Pro Se Defendant and Appellant

